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Chapter 7 
Attachment, Mentalization, and the Self 
Peter Fonagy and Patrick Luyten 
Introduction 
Mentalizing is often simplistically understood as synonymous with the capacity of 
empathy toward other people. In fact, mentalizing comprises a spectrum of capacities that 
critically involve the ability to see one’s own behavior as coherently organized by mental states, 
and to differentiate oneself psychologically from others. It is these capacities that tend to be 
noticeably absent in individuals with a personality disorder (PD), particularly at moments of 
interpersonal stress. In this chapter, we will attempt to demonstrate that such impairments in 
mentalizing are at the heart of our explanatory framework for conceptualizing PDs. The 
foundations of our thinking lie in attachment theory, but, according to our most recent 
formulation, the heart of the relationship between mentalizing and personality pathology lies in 
the capacity of engaging productively in communication, and more specifically, in the quality of 
epistemic trust the individual possesses in relationships and, formatively, in the relationship 
between the child and his/her primary caregivers. Epistemic trust is defined in terms of an 
individual’s experience of communication from others, specifically, the ability to receive and treat 
new knowledge from others as personally relevant and therefore capable of modifying durable 
representational structures pertaining to self, others, and interpersonal relationships. 
Underpinning this capability is the consideration of the informant as a “trustworthy” source 
likely to communicate information that is generalizable and relevant to the self (Fonagy & 
Luyten, in press).  
PDs are often defined in terms of enduring interpersonal difficulties (Higgitt & Fonagy, 
1992). We argue that these difficulties are generated by the rigidity of the patient’s thinking about 
their subjective experience and an inability to engage in authentic communication about the 
causes of his/her own or others’ actions, and therefore to modify his/her behavior in response 
to such communications, in particular. It is this impervious and inflexible quality that has, in the 
past, made patients with PD so conspicuously “hard to treat”.  We thus argue that the 
psychological mechanism behind the rigidity associated with PD is driven by the deep epistemic 
mistrust that has been generated in the patient—whether through environmental adversity, 
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genetic vulnerability, or, most likely,  a complex combination of these factors—which interferes 
with social learning and creates an overreliance on unhelpful forms of mentalizing, or outright 
failures in mentalizing at moments of attachment arousal. 
The mentalizing approach was originally formulated in the context of treating patients 
with borderline personality disorder (BPD) (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004), and has developed into a 
more comprehensive approach to the understanding and treatment of (severe) PD (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2012). More recently, we have moved this thinking a little further, to consider the role of 
epistemic attitudes and epistemic trust in relation to social learning. These recent formulations 
have taken us into an even broader integrative theory about normal and disrupted personality 
development rooted in evolutionary considerations concerning the role of social cognition and 
the intergenerational transmission of knowledge about the (social) world. Three related features 
are considered to be central to PD and the typical distortions in self-experience and relationships 
in patients with PD: (a) disruptions in attachment experiences, (b) associated impairments in 
mentalizing, and (c) epistemic mistrust and hypervigilance. In this chapter, we direct our 
argument in relation to attachment, mentalizing, and epistemic trust to focus on the concept of 
self—a concept that has, historically, been central to thinking about personality pathology, and is 
notably central to the thinking on PD adopted in proposals to reconceptualize the concept of 
PD in DSM (Skodol, 2012). 
 
The Mentalizing Approach to Personality Disorder 
Attachment Relationships and the Development of Mentalizing 
Mentalizing, like language, is a constitutional propensity, largely a developmental 
achievement made over the early years of life. The optimal development of mentalizing depends 
on the quality of attachment relationships, and early attachments in particular. The latter reflect 
the extent to which subjective experiences were adequately mirrored by a trusted other, that is, 
the extent to which attachment figures were able to respond with contingent and marked 
affective displays of their own experience in response to the infant’s subjective experience, thus 
enabling the child to develop second-order representations of his/her own subjective 
experiences. The quality of affect mirroring by attachment figures plays a major role in the 
development of affect regulative processes and self-control (including attention mechanisms and 
effortful control), laying the groundwork for mentalizing capacity in the individual. Mentalizing is 
fundamentally interactive, in that it develops in the context of interactions with others and is 
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continually influenced by others’ levels of mentalizing (i.e., good mentalizing will promote good 
mentalizing, while poor mentalizing pulls for poor mentalizing). 
The Multidimensional Nature of Mentalizing 
Mentalizing is not unidimensional. It can be organized around four polarities, each with 
its own relatively distinct underlying neural circuits (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009): (a) automatic versus 
controlled mentalizing, (b) mentalizing with regard to self or others, (c) mentalizing based on external 
or internal features of self and others, and (d) cognitive versus affective mentalizing. Automatic 
mentalizing refers to fast, parallel reflective processes that require little consciousness or effort, 
whereas controlled mentalizing involves more conscious, deliberate and serial reflective 
processes. The focus in mentalizing can be the self (including one’s embodied experiences) or 
others, and can involve inferences based on external features of others (e.g., facial expressions) 
or direct assumptions about one’s own mind or the mind of others (externally–internally based 
mentalizing). Finally, full mentalizing involves the integration of both cognitive knowledge (i.e., 
agent-attitude-propositions) and affective input (i.e., affective-state propositions).  
Normally, these polarities are in balance, and can be used flexibly depending on the 
processing demands of a particular social context or setting. The persistent dominance of one 
end of a polarity over another signals a potential failure of accurate mental-state understanding. 
Specific forms of psychopathology can be understood on the basis of different combinations of 
impairments along the mentalizing dimensions (Bateman, Bolton, & Fonagy, 2013; Fonagy, 
Bateman, & Bateman, 2011; Fonagy et al., 2010). Different types of psychopathology are 
characterized by different patterns of inappropriate domination of a polarity, the imbalances 
generating apparent failures of mentalizing in the individual. Patients with BPD, for example, 
may typically give a misleading appearance of sophisticated insight or remarkable intuitive 
empathy based on the dominance of external, automatic, and affective mentalizing over internal, 
reflective, and cognitive processing of mental states. This imbalanced structure, breaks down at 
moments of interpersonal stress or attachment arousal (Figure 1). when the capacity for 
reflective mentalizing and cognitive flexibility about the possible motivation or intentions of 
other people (or indeed the self) is called for (Figure 2). Understanding mentalizing as being 
constituted of several sub-processes organized along dimensions rather than a single capacity is 
essential in preventing the iatrogenic effects of therapy for BPD patients that can arise if the 
therapist overestimates the patient’s overall mentalizing capacity based on having identified 
conspicuous, isolated strengths. 
[insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
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The Context/Relationship-specific Nature of Mentalizing  
Furthermore, the capacity to mentalize has both “trait” and “state” aspects that may vary 
in quality in relation to emotional arousal and interpersonal context (e.g., an individual’s 
mentalizing levels may considerably differ when reflecting on his/her relationship with his/her 
mother versus father, or when reflecting “off-line” on these relationships versus “on-line” in the 
course of a real-life interaction). Typically, with increasing arousal, the capacity for controlled 
mentalizing is likely to become (for the context) inappropriately dominated by automatic and 
often unreflective mentalizing as the balance between the two polarities is lost.  
Attachment Strategies, Mentalizing, and Personality Disorder 
Attachment hyperactivating and deactivating strategies play a key role in explaining the 
relationships among stress/arousal and mentalizing in different interpersonal/arousal contexts. 
This explains in part some of the heterogeneity observed within BPD patients and among 
patients with PDs more generally (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). The relationship between 
attachment and imbalances in mentalizing in the context of BPD rests upon the way in which 
attachment hyperactivating or deactivating strategies trigger over-reliance on particular forms of 
mentalizing, obstructing the ability to call upon a wider and more balanced range of mentalizing 
skills.   
Most patients with BPD, for example, are typically characterized by an excessive use of 
attachment hyperactivating strategies, often in the context of disorganized attachment. At least 
two strands of research support the link between hyperactivating strategies and disorganized 
attachment and mentalizing impairments in BPD. The first strand has provided direct evidence 
for such a link by showing that BPD is associated with increased levels of insecure attachment 
styles, by using both interview-based assessment of attachment such as the Adult Attachment 
Interview (AAI), and self-report measures (Steele & Siever, 2010). The second strand relates to 
attachment trauma (Allen, 2013), which we will discuss later in this chapter. These views are 
congruent with general biopsychosocial models of BPD (Oldham, 2009), which assume that 
adverse childhood experiences and genetic factors interact to create a particular combination of 
biological factors (neurobiological structures and dysfunctions) and psychosocial factors 
(personality traits and personality functioning) that underpins BPD pathology (affective and 
behavioral dysregulation and disturbed relatedness).   
Some time ago, Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy & Higgitt, 1990; Fonagy, Target, & 
Gergely, 2000) suggested that hyperactivation of the attachment system may be a core aspect of 
BPD. When exposed to threat and experiencing fear and distress that activates the attachment 
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system, young children are biologically predisposed to seek proximity to their caregiver. If the 
caregiver is optimally sensitive and responsive to the distressed child, a down-regulation of the 
child’s emotion and deactivation of his/her attachment system occurs, and a lasting bond is 
formed to the caregiver who was attentive to the child’s need (Bowlby, 1969, 1973). However, in 
circumstances where early relationships are disrupted, whether for reasons of biology, 
circumstance, or a combination of the two, the proximity seeking that is triggered by activation 
of the child’s attachment system is anticipated to lead to further adverse emotional experience. 
This negative experience generates the same emotional response of fear and distress that triggers 
the attachment system, which then inevitably stimulates further proximity seeking in the 
increasingly forlorn hope of achieving down-regulation (Main, 2000).  Within this model there is 
considerable room for individual differences to emerge; these differences are affected by genetic 
predisposition (Fearon, Shmueli-Goetz, Viding, Fonagy, & Plomin, 2013) and formative 
psychosocial experience (e.g., Fraley, Roisman, Booth-LaForce, Owen, & Holland, 2013; Repetti, 
Taylor, & Seeman, 2002).   
There is now a rich body of empirical data to support these speculations about the 
relationship between attachment and BPD. For example, a large investigation with over 1,400 
participants compared competing multivariate models of adult attachment patterns, impulsivity, 
and trait negative affect as these related to borderline features (Scott, Levy, & Pincus, 2009). The 
relationship between attachment anxiety and features of BPD was most effectively modeled 
when considered to generate negative affectivity and impulsivity. This provided a better fit than 
the alternative model of impulsivity or negative affectivity generating attachment anxiety. This 
study suggested that impulsivity and negative affect can lead to BPD when they occur in the 
context of high levels of attachment anxiety. A review by Agrawal et al. (2004) considered 13 
empirical studies of the adult attachment styles of individuals with BPD; all the studies showed 
an association between BPD and insecure attachment. These findings have been subsequently 
confirmed in comparisons with groups of people with other PDs (Aaronson, Bender, Skodol, & 
Gunderson, 2006; Barone, Fossati, & Guiducci, 2011; Fossati et al., 2005; Meyer, Ajchenbrenner, 
& Bowles, 2005; Scott et al., 2013).   
A further cross-sectional study reported by Choi-Kain, Fitzmaurice, Zanarini, Laverdiere, 
and Gunderson (2009) differentiated patients with mood disorder from patients with BPD on 
the basis of attachment style.  While both depressed patients and patients with BPD showed 
greater preoccupation and fearfulness than did control individuals (although BPD patients were 
more severely affected for both traits), only patients with BPD simultaneously showed 
preoccupation and fearfulness. This study confirmed that, as a number of attachment theorists 
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have suggested, the key marker of BPD is a lack of a functional regulation strategy to reduce 
attachment distress (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008; Main, 2000).   
 
Childhood Adversity, Mentalizing, and Personality Disorder 
In drawing up a mentalizing, developmental model of PD in relation to childhood 
adversity, we suggest that two processes unfold, which have a cumulative effect.  
(1) We assume that the development of mentalizing depends on the social co-construction of 
internal states between the child and his/her parents. Following from this, we hypothesize that 
early neglect and an early emotional environment that is incompatible with the normal 
acquisition of understanding self and others creates vulnerability to PD.  
(2) Furthermore, we hypothesize that subsequent neglect and abuse in an attachment context can 
disrupt mentalization as part of an adaptive adjustment to adversity when a child whose early 
experiences of neglect have left him/her less resilient to deal with trauma is in a state of 
helplessness in relation to the responsible individuals (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgitt, & Target, 
1994; Stein, Fonagy, Ferguson, & Wisman, 2000). 
In summary, we (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009) propose that early emotional neglect, more so 
than physical or sexual abuse, predisposes individuals to developing PD, and specifically BPD, 
by limiting their opportunity to acquire the full spectrum of mentalizing skills, leaving their 
capacity to mentalize vulnerable to being disrupted under the influence of later stress.   
We further contend that childhood environments that are emotionally abusive, or in 
which the discussion and validation of mental states are absent, lead to the generation of coping 
strategies that favor rapid, intuitive (as opposed to more deliberate and reflective), emotion-
focused (as opposed to cognition-focused) mentalizing—particularly in individuals who have 
been primed by experiences of early neglect to identify risk rapidly. This intuitive state is 
dominated by mental-state attributions based on external observable cues (as opposed to the 
inference of internal states, which may be unreliable in a maltreating environment). In addition, 
such individuals may need to develop a strategy of being highly sensitive to and readily 
influenced by (mirroring) mental states in others (at the cost of achieving a clear differentiation 
of “self” and “other” mental states) (Fonagy, 2000; Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Luyten, Fonagy, 
Lowyck, & Vermote, 2012).   
We wish to emphasize that while this approach may appear to suggest a deficit theory, 
our emphasis is upon adaptation. For instance, the specific configuration of mentalizing 
capacities that characterizes individuals with BPD may be conceived of as that most likely to 
favor survival under conditions of significant adversity (Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Clark 
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Barrett, 2013). Our model is fully compatible with Linehan’s (1993) original biosocial theory of 
the development of BPD and its later elaboration (Crowell, Beauchaine, & Linehan, 2009), which 
emphasizes that an invalidating childhood environment can serve to undermine the 
understanding, regulation, and toleration of affect states, leading the child to adapt by displaying 
more extreme emotions to achieve a contingent response from carers, that is, the intermittent 
reinforcement of extreme emotional outbursts.  
In line with these assumptions, many studies support the suggestion that secure children 
perform better than insecure children at mentalization tasks (see, e.g., de Rosnay & Harris, 2002). 
The first of these, (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, & Holder, 1997), from the London Parent–Child 
Project, reported that 82% of children who were securely attached to their mother in the Strange 
Situation passed Harris’s Belief-Desire Reasoning Task at age 5.5 years, compared with 50% of 
those who showed an avoidant attachment style and 33% of the few children with preoccupied 
attachment. As we will describe in more detail later, findings along these lines are not always 
consistent (see, e.g., Meins et al., 2002), but in general it appears that secure attachment and 
mentalizing are affected by similar social influences.  
It is necessary to identify what it is about emotional abuse and neglect that can render the 
child increasingly vulnerable to disrupted mentalizing.  We (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009) have 
stressed the importance of secure attachment in providing a context within which the child can 
develop the ability to mentalize and regulate his/her own emotions. Clearly, in an environment 
that is invalidating and emotionally abusive, an insecure and disorganized attachment pattern is 
likely to develop (Fonagy, 2000; Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). We contend that it is the absence of a 
“safe base”, from which the child can learn the capacity to mentalize and self-regulate, that can 
create a greater vulnerability for developing PD (and BPD in particular) in later life.   
For instance, emotional dysregulation (Gratz, Tull, Baruch, Bornovalova, & Lejuez, 
2008), schema modes (particularly disconnection/rejection and impaired limits; Specht, 
Chapman, & Cellucci, 2009), and distorted self-representation in middle childhood (Carlson, 
Egeland, & Sroufe, 2009) have all been shown to mediate the relationship between childhood 
abuse and BPD. However, these studies used a composite score of maltreatment rather than 
focusing on particular aspects of emotional abuse and/or neglect. Rogosch and Cicchetti (2005) 
found that attentional networks and processes did not mediate the precursors to BPD in children 
who had been abused. The formation of schemas and the representation of the self, which are 
often conspicuously impoverished in individuals with BPD, are themselves mediated by the 
selective disruption of social cognition (Carlson et al., 2009). These studies point to the 
importance of these key psychological processes in mediating the impact of childhood 
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experience of trauma on the development of BPD symptoms in later life. More work is needed 
in this area, but the research to date suggests that the psychological processes that make the 
impact of trauma on personality development so harmful and enduring relate to the emergence 
of the concept of self and identity. 
BPD patients have also been found to exhibit high levels of alexithymia (i.e., impairments 
in mentalizing with regard to the self) and have difficulty in describing their emotions in social 
situations (New et al., 2012)—features that have both been related to trauma. In samples 
containing a majority of patients reporting early trauma, patients showed amygdala 
hyperreactivity in response to viewing emotional or neutral images, combined with blunted 
subjective appraisals of these same stimuli (Hazlett et al., 2012; Minzenberg, Fan, New, Tang, & 
Siever, 2007). Considered in relation to attachment, the mentalizing deficits associated with 
childhood maltreatment may be a form of decoupling, inhibition, or even a phobic reaction to 
mentalizing: (a) the experience of adversity may undermine cognitive development in general 
(Cicchetti, Rogosch, & Toth, 2000; Crandell & Hobson, 1999; Stacks, Beeghly, Partridge, & 
Dexter, 2011); (b) the mentalizing problems may reflect arousal problems associated with 
exposure to chronic stress (see Cicchetti & Walker, 2001); and (c) the child may avoid 
mentalizing to avoid perceiving the abuser’s hostile and malevolent thoughts and feelings about 
him/her (e.g., Fonagy, 1991; Goodman, Quas, & Ogle, 2010). These potential problems will all 
have a significant negative impact on a child’s psychological, emotional, social, and educational 
development.  
Maltreatment can contribute to an acquired partial “mind-blindness” by compromising 
open, reflective communication between parent and child. It may undermine the benefit derived 
from learning about the links between internal states and actions in attachment relationships 
(e.g., the child may be told that he/she “deserves”, “wants”, or even “enjoys” the abuse to which 
he/she is being subjected). This is more likely to be harmful if the maltreatment is being 
perpetrated by a family member. In cases when the maltreatment is taking place outside the 
home, the parents’ lack of awareness of it may serve to invalidate the child’s communications 
with the parents about his/her feelings. In such a situation the child finds that reflective 
discourse does not correspond to his/her feelings—a consistent misunderstanding that could 
reduce the child’s ability to understand and mentalize verbal explanations of other people’s 
actions. In such circumstances, the child is likely to struggle to detect the mental states behind 
people’s actions, and will tend to see these actions as inevitable rather than intended.   
Taken together, these views clearly imply that the foundations of subjective selfhood will 
be less robustly established in individuals who have experienced early neglect. These individuals 
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will find it more difficult to learn about how subjective experiences inevitably vary between 
people and the need for flexibility in relation to the relative merits of one’s own and alternative 
perspectives.  As we have described, in some longitudinal investigations, low parental affection 
or nurturing in early childhood appears to be more strongly associated with elevated risk for 
borderline, antisocial, paranoid, and schizotypal PDs than do physical or sexual abuse in 
adolescence (Afifi et al., 2011; Gao, Raine, Chan, Venables, & Mednick, 2010; Hengartner, 
Ajdacic-Gross, Rodgers, Muller, & Rossler, 2013; Johnson, Cohen, Kasen, Ehrensaft, & 
Crawford, 2006; Powers, Thomas, Ressler, & Bradley, 2011; Tyrka, Wyche, Kelly, Price, & 
Carpenter, 2009; Widom, Czaja, & Paris, 2009), again pointing to the importance of neglect, low 
parental involvement, and emotional maltreatment in undermining the normally biologically 
predetermined learning and communication processes that are involved in the healthy 
development of perspective taking.   
The Re-emergence of Nonmentalizing Modes 
Modes of experiencing the self and others that are characteristic of the prementalizing 
child tend to re-emerge whenever we lose the ability to mentalize, as typically happens in 
individuals with PD, particularly in high arousal contexts (Fonagy & Target, 1997). According to 
our conceptualization of mentalizing as consisting of four polarities, we understand the 
emergence of these nonmentalizing modes as indications of imbalances in mentalizing, in which 
one extreme form of mentalizing has come to dominate. We have described these 
nonmentalizing modes as falling into three distinct categories (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 
2002), as a way of understanding the subjective mentalizing experience of the individual and 
providing a formulation that is useful for clinicians, particularly when they are responding to 
highly affect driven, nonmentalizing behaviour on the part of the patient. 
(a) In the psychic equivalence mode, thoughts and feelings become overwhelmingly real, allowing for 
no alternative perspectives or doubt. This mode reflects the domination of self:affect state 
thinking with limited internal focus. 
(b) In the teleological mode there is only a recognition of real, observable goal-directed behavior and 
objectively discernible events that may potentially constrain these goals. Hence, there is a 
recognition of the existence and potential role of mental states, but limited to very concrete and 
observable goals. This mode reflects an extreme exterior focus and the momentary loss of 
controlled mentalizing. 
(c) In the pretend mode, thoughts and feelings become severed from reality (“hypermentalizing” or 
“pseudomentalizing”), which, in the extreme, may lead to feelings of de-realization and 
dissociation. This reflects controlled mentalizing being dominated by an implicit but inadequately 
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internal focus, combined with poor belief-desire reasoning and a consequent sense of 
vulnerability to fusion with others. 
Understanding and recognizing the prementalizing modes is important because they 
often appear alongside a pressure to externalize unmentalized and self-hating aspects of the self 
(so-called “alien-self” parts). Torturing feelings of badness, possibly linked to experiences of 
abuse that are felt to be part of the self but are not integrated with it (the “alien-self” parts), can 
come to dominate self-experience. We assume that these discontinuities in internal experience 
(when the person feels aspects of their self-experience to be of themselves or their own, and yet 
also to be alien) generate a sense of incongruence, which is dealt with through externalizing. For 
example, the individual may attempt to dominate the mind-states of others, through behaving 
toward others as though the others own the unmentalized self-experiences and on occasions 
even being successful in generating these experiences in them (Fonagy & Target, 2000). This 
brings about relief, even if the immediate impact of externalizing a torturing part of the self in 
this way is to manipulate the other person into punitive persecutory behavior toward the self. 
Attempts to adapt to these torturing internal experiences can also manifest as attacks upon the 
self (e.g., self-harming behaviors) or other types of behavior that in the teleological mode are 
expected to relieve tension and arousal (Fonagy & Target, 2000). 
 
Mentalizing and the Self  
How do these considerations help us to understand the subjective experience of patients 
with PD, and in particular the feelings of identity diffusion that are typical of many of these 
patients? We approach this question from a developmental psychopathology perspective in line 
with the more general mentalizing approach. Most modern psychological approaches assume 
that self-coherence (the sense that one has continuity and consistency in thought and behavior) 
is something of an illusion (Bargh, 2011, 2014). Thought of in this way, there can be no such 
thing as self-coherence, identity, or self; these are constructs referring to a self-generated feeling 
or a subjective state of coherence. This is not to deny the importance of self-coherence. On the 
contrary, we submit that a feeling or state of self-coherence is at the heart of mental health and is 
associated with feelings of agency and autonomy.  
How then can we understand individuals with PD from this perspective? Identity 
diffusion, that is, a lack of self-coherence, has notably been central to many theoretical 
formulations of serious PD. A disturbed sense of identity, or “failure to establish stable and 
integrated representations of self and others” (Livesley, 2003, p. 19), is frequently described as 
characteristic of BPD (e.g. Blatt & Auerbach, 1988; Bradley & Westen, 2005; Jorgensen, 2010; 
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Kernberg, 1975, 1984) and was a core part of the reformulation of PD proposed for DSM-5, 
criticized by many (Shedler et al., 2010; Shedler et al., 2011), which found its way into Section III 
of DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Rooted in a dysfunction or deficit of a 
sense of agency or self-directedness, this characteristic has also been identified in empirical 
clinical studies (e.g., Adler, Chin, Kolisetty, & Oltmanns, 2012; Barnow, Ruge, Spitzer, & 
Freyberger, 2005; Bender & Skodol, 2007; Jorgensen et al., 2012).  
We argue that it is the capacity for mentalizing that enables us to create and maintain this 
consistent sense of the self across different contexts: mental-state language and the experience of 
being “mind-minded” (Meins et al., 2002) constructs the narrative around one’s thoughts and 
feelings, which in turn helps us continuously to construct a benign and coherent self-structure. 
When mentalizing impairments weaken this integrative process, an experience of incoherence in 
self-representation is likely to emerge. Rather than seeing personality impairments as classically 
defined—as impairments in the self or rigidity in representations—we thus postulate that PD in 
fact involves failures of this building process and generates a sense of epistemic rigidity, which 
inhibits the dynamic and ongoing construction of the self. Rigidity is often invoked in 
discussions of the phenomenology of PD (Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004; Caligor, Kernberg, & 
Clarkin, 2007; McWilliams, 1994; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Rogers & Dymond, 1954). Rigidity, 
as we use the term here, describes a state of being closed to social learning, which requires being 
comfortable in taking knowledge from others as relevant to oneself—what we might refer to as a 
sense of epistemic trust.  As we will explain in more detail in the next section, we see rigidity as 
indicating the absence of a willingness to fully engage in social learning, and PD as reflecting 
impairments in mentalizing that are associated with an exaggeration of epistemic vigilance (being on 
the lookout for the possibility of being misled): it signifies epistemic mistrust of the interpersonal 
world. If we conceptualize our sense of self as a consequence of a process of mentalizing rather 
than a fixed representation, then exaggerated vigilance or epistemic hypervigilance will inhibit the 
internalization of social knowledge and the reflection on this knowledge that is necessary for the 
healthy maintenance of the social learning process. 
This more dynamic approach to the ongoing relationship between mentalizing, the social 
environment, and the construction of the self is at odds with the traditional tendency to reify the 
notion of representation or internal working models of self and other. This inclination is best 
exemplified by theoretical writings and empirical studies on the (hierarchical) organization of 
object or attachment representations, descriptions of splitting of object representations, and even 
studies on the activation of object representations commonly present in traditional 
psychodynamic formulations (Fonagy & Target, 2003).   
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These can be clinically useful descriptions, but they are no longer in line with what we 
now know about representational processes: representations do not exist; they thus cannot be 
split or integrated, and they cannot be hierarchically or even nonhierarchically organized (see 
Fonagy, 1982 for an early exposition of this point of view). A more parsimonious way of 
describing these processes, which would also be in line with our growing knowledge of 
representational processes in the brain (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Luyten & Blatt, 2013), is to 
conceptualize them in terms of states of mind that, for instance, are created by the capacity for 
mentalizing, which is itself subserved by different neural circuits (Luyten et al., 2012). It would 
therefore be more accurate to say that we generate a representation of ourselves and others, 
rather than that we “have” representations that are stored somewhere, and which are 
hierarchically organized and can be activated, changed, or structurally modified. What is assumed 
to be a trait-like quality of representations (e.g., self-representation) is better described as stability 
in the capacity for generating such representations, or even better as states of mind that bring 
some stability in our experience of self.  
Further, in the context of this notional representation that is stable, differentiated, and 
integrated, there is little space for the reality that we all sometimes feel inferior, fragmented, or 
isolated. Traditionally, such states are understood as reflecting the activation of split-off or 
repressed representations, perhaps because of defensive processes, or as regression. But again, 
do we really believe that we have stored somewhere various representations of ourselves and 
others that can be (re-)activated? We can explain these same phenomena much more 
parsimoniously by arguing that in particular circumstances (i.e., when arousal/conflict is high), 
we are unable to create a feeling of stability, agency, and positive self-regard; we do not need to 
assume more.  
This has important clinical and research implications. It means that patients do not 
“change” their self (and object) representations as a result of treatment or experiences (and thus 
we should not try to assess these changes in their representations); rather, they have acquired the 
capacity to think and feel differently about themselves and others, and thus to think, reflect, and 
narrate differently about themselves and others. Hence, the primary focus in treatment (and in 
outcome studies) should be on these capacities and not on changes in object representations per 
se, which are a secondary consequence (the fruit on the tree, so to speak) of a growing capacity 
for social cognition.   
Indeed, when one considers the human ability to reflect on self-experience in relation to 
others, it naturally follows that this capacity shows both features of stability and change over 
time, as it is likely to be influenced by context (and particularly attachment contexts) (Luyten et 
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al., 2012). Similarly, demanding that the self, identity, or personality should be highly stable 
across the life span makes little sense from this perspective, as people do not have a self, identity, 
or personality; rather, they have the ability, to a greater or lesser extent, to activate a more or less 
consistent, coherent, and differentiated feeling or experience of coherence and stability. It is this 
reflective function that creates a feeling of coherence in the moment, rather than it being the case 
that there is a feeling of coherence. This is also congruent with findings from neuroscience 
suggesting that a cortical midline system is responsible for generating the experience of self as 
distinct from others (Fonagy & Luyten, in press; Luyten & Blatt, 2013; Northoff, Qin, & 
Feinberg, 2011). 
This idea of the self as a work in progress also allows us to take into account a way of 
accommodating the role of the social environment in the sense of self. A long-standing critique 
of psychoanalytic thinking and psychology more broadly is that they both fail to take into 
account the effects of how the socioeconomic environment might buffet the individual psyche 
(Fonagy, Target, & Gergely, 2006). Given the evidence accruing that increasing levels of social 
inequality are connected with an increased prevalence of BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, in press), an 
approach to PD that understands the mechanism between personality pathology and the social 
context of the self is even more pertinent (Grant et al., 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). An 
explanation of psychopathology relating to the self that allows for the impact of the environment 
in an evolutionarily convincing manner is made possible by this dynamic interpretation of our 
self-representations. If we consider that the evolutionary drive behind mentalizing was to enable 
human survival in increasingly complex social situations involving matters of hierarchy, 
cooperation, exclusion, and inclusion, it makes eminent sense that representations of ourselves 
and those around us should calibrate the extent to which we may be experiencing social isolation, 
alienation, or inferiority.  
Psychological resilience enables an individual to resist these pressures to some degree. By 
contrast, individuals with PD are often conspicuously reactive to such pressures, while to be 
wholly impervious to their effects suggests mentalizing impairments of a different nature 
altogether. Both extremes, however, derive from a lack of capacity to absorb information from 
the social environment in a way that is compatible with the construction of a normatively 
coherent sense of self. This ability, or inability, to take in social data, and to be able to reflect 
upon it with some coherence and pragmatism, is key to understanding PD, with its 
phenomenology of enduring interpersonal difficulties and troubled sense of self. It is the second-
order developmental constructs of flexibility and rigidity that determine how individuals respond 
to the aspects of their environment or themselves that constitute what we might call 
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personality—whether we term these cognitive schemas, internal object relationships, 
interpersonal expectations, or intersubjective concerns. Rigidity points to an individual’s inability 
to progress fluidly, flexibly, and adaptively across the phases of individual development; it is a 
meta-construct associated with personality functioning. According to this thinking, the concept 
of rigidity encapsulates an understanding of PD as the failure of appropriate responsiveness to 
information within a system at the interface of the person and his/her social environment. 
The three prementalizing modes, discussed earlier, are significant here; they constitute 
forms of mentalizing that make the individual appear difficult or even impossible to reach, 
rendering them potentially impervious to meaningful social influence. Rigidity, or the inability to 
adjust to other, more reflective forms of mentalizing, breaks down the individual’s ability to form 
a stable self-structure, creating the fragmented sense of self often experientially associated with 
BPD. Rigidity is perhaps greatest in individuals who show both the high level of avoidance and 
intense attachment anxiety that is so typical of patients with BPD (e.g., Choi-Kain et al., 2009): 
An irresolvable dilemma is created by an intense desire for reassurance from an attachment 
figure if the individual is also unable to fully accept this reassurance owing to a mistrust of the 
attachment figure’s motives. Thus, while security is buttressed by flexibility, which derives from 
refusing to consider closeness and autonomy as antagonistic and irreconcilable goals, insecurity 
and partial rigidity arise when an individual is unable to relocate on the closeness–distance 
dimension without fearing either a permanent loss of autonomy or the loss of affection of 
his/her attachment figure. The key here is the invalidation of interpersonal information that 
arises from any encounter, regardless of the nature of the information. Even a positive response 
from the attachment figure will, in the context of epistemic mistrust, be discounted by 
assumptions about the person’s motives. But dismissal or closing of the flow of information is 
also unsustainable because of the overriding need for reassurance. Let us now scrutinize further 
this concept of trust as it applies to socially transmitted information. 
 
Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust 
Studies of attachment have confirmed that secure attachment is driven by sensitive 
responsivity of the caregiver contingent upon the infant’s reaction (Belsky & Fearon, 2008; 
Marvin & Britner, 2008). In addition, we have maintained that attachment experiences also 
provide the context in which mentalizing by the caregiver can influence the security of 
attachment and mentalizing in the child (Arnott & Meins, 2007; Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & 
Higgitt, 1991; Grienenberger, Kelly, & Slade, 2005; Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 
2001; Meins et al., 2002; Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & Locker, 2005). Recently, we 
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have added a third consideration:  secure attachment is created by a system that simultaneously 
generates a sense of epistemic trust.   
Looked at from a distance, micro-analytic (e.g. Beebe et al., 2010) and more global (e.g., 
DeWolf & van IJzendoorn, 1997; Isabella, Belsky, & von Eye, 1989; Kiser, Bates, Maslin, & 
Bayles, 1986; Mills-Koonce et al., 2007) ratings of sensitive caregiving can be seen as in essence 
recognizing the child’s agentive self. We believe that through the down-regulation of affect that 
results from successful proximity seeking in the distressed infant, attachment not only establishes 
a lasting bond, but also opens a channel for information that can be used for the transfer of 
knowledge between the generations. Given that the infant needs to overcome the self-
preservative barrier created by natural epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010; Wilson & 
Sperber, 2012) and open his/her mind to acquiring the myriad pieces of culturally relevant 
information on which his/her survival will ultimately depend, it is fortunate that nature 
(evolution) has provided us with a mechanism of deferential knowledge transmission that can 
create an “epistemic superhighway” between learners and teachers, who normally share genetic 
material (Hamilton, 1964). It is this openness to information transfer that we believe offers the 
cognitive advantage to secure attachment that has been fairly consistently noted, although not to 
our knowledge systematically studied (e.g., Crandell & Hobson, 1999; Jacobsen & Hofmann, 
1997; Moss, Rousseau, Parent, St.-Laurent, & Saintong, 1998). Although still somewhat 
speculative, evidence for these assumptions comes from two strands of research that are 
increasingly becoming intertwined: (a) developmental studies and (b) evolutionary approaches 
concerning the development of social cognition (for a detailed discussion, see Fonagy & Allison, 
2014; Fonagy & Luyten, in press; Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2014).  
As we suggested elsewhere (Fonagy et al., 2014), building on pioneering work by Dan 
Sperber (Sperber et al., 2010; Wilson & Sperber, 2012) and accumulating developmental evidence 
(e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009), secure attachment experiences pave the way for the acquisition of 
mentalizing at the same time as fostering epistemic trust. In other words, natural selection may 
have hit upon attachment as a means to mediate the reliable transmission of “memes” from one 
generation to the next. Secure attachment helps to create a benign condition for the relaxation of 
epistemic vigilance, and sensitive and appropriate ostensive cueing is a key constituent element 
of sensitivity on the part of the primary caregiver. Attachment is a much older instinct, in 
evolutionary terms, than the imperative to generate epistemic trust for the safe transmission of 
“memes”; in that sense the two processes are distinct. In terms of the phenomenology of child 
development, however, they are closely interwoven, and it seems likely that in human evolution 
epistemic trust piggy-backed on to pre-existing attachment processes.   
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However, we suggest that while attachment may be a key mechanism for mediating 
epistemic trust, it is secondary to an underlying biological process preserved by evolution. In 
other words, secure attachment is unlikely to be necessary for generating epistemic trust but it may 
be sufficient to do so; furthermore, it is the most pervasive mechanism in early childhood because it 
is a highly evolutionarily effective indicator of trustworthiness.  
 
Implications for the treatment of PD 
The Mentalization-Based Treatment Approach 
Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT) is firmly grounded in the theoretical model we 
have outlined in the early sections of this chapter. The approach regards imbalances in 
mentalizing as the core of the enduring difficulties of BPD and other types of personality 
pathology, and the aim of treatment is thus the restoration of more balanced mentalizing 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2010). MBT was initially devised for the treatment of patients with BPD in 
a partial hospital setting. More recently it has developed into a more comprehensive approach to 
the understanding and treatment of PDs in a range of clinical contexts, including patients with 
antisocial PD (Bateman & Fonagy, 2008), patients with BPD and marked comorbid eating 
disorders (Robinson et al., 2014), and patients with less marked personality pathology (Allen, 
Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008). 
The theoretical model implies that in order to maximize the effect on the patient’s ability 
to think about thoughts and feelings in the context of relationships, especially in the early phases 
of treatment, the therapist is probably most helpful when his/her interventions (a) are simple 
and easy to understand, (b) are affect focused, (c) actively engage the patient, (d) focus on the 
patient’s mind rather than on his/her behavior, (e) relate to a current event or activity—that is, 
whatever is the patient’s currently felt mental reality (in working memory), (f) make use of the 
therapist’s mind as a model (by the therapist disclosing his/her expected reaction in response to 
the event being discussed, by explaining to the patient how he/she anticipates that he or she 
might react in that situation), and (g) are flexibly adjusted in terms of their complexity and 
emotional intensity in response to the level of the patient’s emotional arousal (i.e., withdrawing 
when arousal and attachment are strongly activated).  
The key task of therapy is thus to promote curiosity about the way mental states motivate 
and explain the actions of the self and others. MBT therapists achieves this through the judicious 
use of an inquisitive stance, highlighting their own interest in the mental states underpinning 
behavior, qualifying their own understanding and inferences (in that mental states are opaque), 
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and showing how such information can help the patient to make sense of his/her own 
experiences. Pseudomentalization and other fillers to replace genuine mentalization (as described 
earlier in this chapter) should be explicitly identified by the therapist and the lack of practical 
success associated with them clearly explained. In this way, therapists can help their patients to 
learn about how they think and feel about themselves and others, how those thoughts and 
feelings shape their responses to others, and how “errors” in understanding self and others may 
lead them to inappropriate actions. Conversely, it is not for the therapist to tell patients about 
how they feel, what they think, how they should behave, or what the underlying (conscious or 
unconscious) reasons for their difficulties may be. In fact, any approach which tends toward 
claiming to “know” how or why patients “are”, or to dictate how they should behave and think, 
is likely to be iatrogenic in individuals whose capacity to mentalize is vulnerable. 
While the MBT model has a reasonable evidence base (Bateman & Fonagy, 2009, 2013), 
it makes the strong and so far almost unwarranted assumption that the increasing capacity to 
mentalize drives an improvement in BPD symptoms such as self-harming behavior or suicidality. 
Focusing on the concept of epistemic trust enables us furthermore to reconceptualize the 
importance of mentalizing as a key part of therapeutic effectiveness. 
Reconceptualization of treatment: Three systems 
Our thinking in relation to the role of rigidity and epistemic mistrust in PD has led us to 
reconceptualize treatment and the purported mechanisms of change in the treatment of these 
patients. We believe there is a case to be made for understanding the underlying processes at 
work for all therapeutic interventions that have been found to be effective in PDs. In the case of 
BPD, for instance, a considerable number of different therapies have now been found to be 
effective (for a review, see Leichsenring, Leibing, Kruse, New, & Leweke, 2011) Such forms of 
treatment all benefit from a well-articulated theoretical framework and a reliable model for 
delivery of treatment. However, other than this, it is not possible to isolate a factor common to 
all these therapies that can explain their effectiveness, and which can be pinpointed as missing 
from interventions that are less effective. A single model that accounts for how the effective 
therapies work while accommodating their theoretical specificities is one that accounts for the 
process that underpins them. In light of our argument, outlined earlier, about epistemic trust, we 
posit that there are in fact three different processes that are necessarily undergone across 
successful treatments. 
Attachment, Mentalization, and the Self 18 
Communication system 1: The teaching and learning of content and the increase 
of epistemic openness  
All evidence-based psychotherapies provide a coherent, consistent, and continuous 
framework that enables the patient to examine the issues that are deemed to be central to 
him/her according to a particular theoretical approach (e.g., early schemas, invalidating 
experiences, object relations, current attachment experiences) in a safe and low-arousal context. 
These psychotherapies thus provide the patient with helpful skills or knowledge, such as 
strategies to handle emotional dysregulation or restructured interpersonal relationship schemata.  
Perhaps more importantly however, all evidence-based psychotherapies implicitly provide for the 
patient a model of mind and an understanding of his/her disorder, as well as a hypothetical 
appreciation of the process of change, that are accurate enough to enable the patient to feel recognized as 
agentive, empowered to make decisions and alter the course of his/her path through life. The 
conceptual model of each treatment contains considerable personally relevant information so the 
patient experiences feeling markedly mirrored or “understood”.  Helpful, directive approaches 
may be more likely than a generic exploratory style to communicate a clear recognition of the 
patient’s position (McAleavey & Castonguay, 2013). The idea that psychotherapies have in 
common the creation of a sense of being understood while differing in the understandings they 
provide has been part of integrative approaches to psychotherapy since common factor 
approaches were first proposed (e.g., Frank & Frank, 1991; Prochaska & Norcross, 2013; 
Rogers, 1951). We know that without a coherent body of knowledge based on a systematically 
established set of principles, psychological therapy is of little value (Benish, Imel, & Wampold, 
2008). Even in large cohort study meta-analyses, therapies without a credible and tight 
intellectual frame are observed to fail (Abbass, Rabung, Leichsenring, Refseth, & Midgley, 2013).   
The fact that so many different therapies, using so many different theoretical models, 
have been found to be of some benefit indicates that the significance of communication system 
1 lies perhaps not only in the essential truth of the “wisdom” of the specific approach, but also 
in that it causes the patient to give weight to communication from the social world (Ahn & 
Wampold, 2001; Paris, 2013). This brings us to the second communication system at work in 
psychotherapy. 
Communication system 2: The re-emergence of robust mentalizing 
As noted earlier, through passing on knowledge and skills that feel appropriate and 
helpful to the patient, the therapist implicitly recognizes the patient’s agency. The therapist’s 
presentation of information that is relevant to the patient serves as a form of ostensive cue that 
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conveys the impression that the therapist seeks to understand the patient’s perspective; this in 
turn enables the patient to listen and to hear. In effect, the therapist is modeling how he/she 
engages in mentalizing in relation to the patient. It is important that in this process both patient 
and therapist come to see each other more clearly as intentional agents. It is not sufficient for the 
therapist to present his/her “mentalizing wisdom” to the patient if the therapist is not 
him/herself clearly seen as an agentive actor whose actions are predictable given the principles of 
theoretical rationality (Kiraly, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013). The context of an open and trustworthy 
social situation helps to achieve a better understanding of the beliefs, wishes, and desires 
underpinning the actions of others and of the self. This in turn allows for a more trusting 
relationship in the consulting room. Ideally, the patient’s feeling of having been sensitively 
responded to by the therapist opens a second virtuous cycle in interpersonal communication in 
which the patient’s own capacity to mentalize is regenerated. 
However, the mentalizing of patients—that is, acting in accordance with the patient’s 
perspective—may be a common factor across psychotherapies not because patients need to learn 
about the contents of their minds or those of others, but because mentalizing may be a generic 
way of increasing epistemic trust and therefore achieving change in mental function.  
We would like to underline a point that may seem initially puzzling given our own 
declared commitment to mentalization-based psychotherapy: mentalizing in itself is only an 
intermediate step and is not the ultimate therapeutic objective. True and lasting improvement, we believe 
,rests on a third communication system: learning from experience beyond therapy.   
Communication system 3: The re-emergence of social learning with improved 
mentalizing and epistemic trust 
We hypothesize that feeling understood, just as in normal psychological development, 
opens a key biological route to information transmission and the possibility of taking in 
knowledge that is felt to be personally relevant and generalizable; this is what brings about 
change in previously rigidly held beliefs. In essence, the experience of feeling thought about 
enables us to learn new things about our social world.  
We hypothesize that, as the patient’s state of epistemic hypervigilance relaxes, he/she 
develops a greater capacity to trust and begins to discover new ways of learning about others.  
This facilitates an increase in the patient’s willingness to modify his/her cognitive structures for 
interpreting the behavior of others. Positive social experiences that in the past were discounted 
as a result of the patient’s epistemic hypervigilance now have the potential to have a positive 
impact. This is the third system of communication, which becomes available once the second 
system, which is specific to the therapeutic situation, has enhanced the patient’s capacity to 
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mentalize. As the patient begins to experience social interactions in a more benign way and to 
view his/her social situations more accurately (e.g., not seeing an experience of temporary social 
disappointment as a complete rejection), he/she can update his/her knowledge of both the self 
and others.   
It is the recovery of capacity for social information exchange that, we feel, may be at the 
heart of all effective psychotherapies. These therapies impart an ability to benefit from benign 
social intentions, and to update and build on knowledge about the self and others in social 
situations.  The improved sense of epistemic trust derived from mentalizing enables learning 
from social experience; in this way the third virtuous cycle is maintained beyond therapy.  
As therapists we often assume that the process in the consulting room is the primary 
driver of change, but experience shows us that change is also brought about by what happens 
beyond therapy, in the person’s social environment.  Empirical evidence from studies employing 
session-by-session monitoring of change suggests that the therapeutic alliance in one session 
foretells change in the next (Falkenstrom, Granstrom, & Holmqvist, 2013; Tasca & Lampard, 
2012). This suggests that the change that occurs is a consequence of changed attitudes to 
learning, engendered by therapy, modifying behavior between sessions. The implication is that the 
extent to which a patient derives benefit from therapy also depends on what he/she encounters 
in his/her particular social world during and after treatment, that is, the changes in person–
environment exchanges that result from the patient’s increased openness to the evolutionary 
determined and rehabilitated capacity for social learning. We predict that psychotherapy for PD 
is therefore much more likely to be beneficial if the individual’s social environment at the time of 
treatment is largely benign, or becomes more benign.  Although we do not know of any 
systematic studies that have explored this moderator, clinical experience suggests that there is 
likely to be some validity to this assertion.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Patients with PDs are often notoriously difficult to treat. The often paradoxical 
combination of marked rigidity and the fluidity of their self-experiences and relationships may 
confuse clinicians, and give them the feeling that they have no grip on what is happening in these 
patients and in their therapeutic relationships. Patients with PD often have considerable 
difficulty in developing a working alliance because they distrust what the clinician is offering 
them; this may even lead to a simple refusal to be treated. Even when these patients accept 
treatment, they almost invariably face the therapist’s suggestions and interpretations with 
Attachment, Mentalization, and the Self 21 
distrust; this situation frequently persists a very long time, and change typically happens only 
slowly as they become more trusting of their treating clinician.  
This chapter reflects our evolving attempt to understand these phenomena from a 
mentalizing perspective. Our previous views primarily focused on disruptions in attachment 
relationships and associated mentalizing impairments in explaining the typical features of patients 
with (severe) PD. Specifically, we have consistently argued that early attachment disruptions, 
likely often in combination with biological vulnerability, give rise to often severe mentalizing 
impairments, which lead to serious discontinuity in the self and associated relational problems. 
This inconsistency in the self-experience, which we conceptualize as resulting from an incapacity 
to generate a more coherent sense of self because of impairments in mentalizing capacity, leads 
to a constant pressure to externalize “alien self” parts, which may be expressed in a tendency to 
dominate the mental states of others and/or (particularly in BPD, but also, for instance, in 
paranoid PD and antisocial PD) self-harm. More recently, we have drawn attention to a third, 
closely related factor, the epistemic mistrust or epistemic hypervigilance that results from attachment 
disruptions. This inhibits openness to social knowledge and the reflection on this knowledge that 
is necessary for the healthy maintenance of the evolutionary rooted social learning process that is 
typical of human beings.  
These formulations are likely to have important implications for the treatment of patients 
with PDs and particularly in relation to the discussion on the role of so-called specific versus 
common factors in the treatment of these patients, and our continuous efforts to develop 
interventions for these “hard to reach” patients. 
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Figure 1. Switch from Controlled Mentalizing to Nonmentalizing/Pre-mentalizing 
Modes under Conditions of High Arousal. 
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Figure 2. Mentalizing Profile of Borderline Personality Disorder Across the Four 
Polarities that Underlie Mentalizing. 
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